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Abstract
Our paper analyses the observed and desired labour supply of older work-
ers and (recent) retirees in a country (Italy) with limited opportunities
for flexible work schedules. For this purpose, we use a unique dataset
drawn from the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) providing information on both desired and actual working hours.
Our empirical analysis documents the gap between older individuals’ de-
sired and observed labour supply at both the extensive and the intensive
margins and traces it back to gender, education and family composition.
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The paper provides useful insights into the potential effectiveness of poli-
cies such as gradual retirement and part-time work in increasing older
workers’ employment.
Keywords: retirement, desired labour supply, flexible retirement.
JEL: J26, J14.
1 Introduction
Population ageing points to the need to increase the employment rate of older
workers in order to guarantee both the sustainability of pension systems and the
adequacy of resources in retirement. To achieve this goal, the main strategy of
almost all European countries has consisted of increases in the statutory retire-
ment age, the tightening up of minimum requirements and on financial incentives
to postpone retirement beyond the minimum (OECD, 2016; Eurofound, 2016;
European Commission, 2015). Although some countries (Italy among them)
have established an automatic link between longevity and retirement age, the
compulsory extension of working life is obviously not an “ad libitum” viable
policy. The policy, moreover, reflects a rather traditional retirement scenario,
typically characterized by full-time work ending abruptly in complete leisure.
This retirement pattern may not be what workers, or a significant proportion of
them, want. The harsh discontinuity between working life and retirement, when
the latter suddenly reduces working hours from full-time to zero, can indeed be
regarded as a welfare-decreasing factor. If rigidities in both the pension system
and the labour market prevent individuals from doing part-time work, workers
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may feel constrained to retire earlier than they would have done. People may
prefer retirement to full-time work, but they may be willing to continue to work
if they have access to a reduced effort level. Policy interventions designed to
foster flexibility in the working schedule and to increase the possibility of com-
bining a pension and work, with some sort of gradual retirement, would then
be welfare improving. Given workers’ heterogeneity, investigating the charac-
teristics of the people who would be better off if they had access to a smoother
scheme of retirement is the first step in designing appropriate policies. In this
paper, we look at preferences for hours of work expressed by older individuals,
whether in employment or already retired, and compare them to their effective
working hours (which may be zero in the case of full retirement). The analysis
gives us an estimate of the “discouraged” labour supply that older workers could
instead deliver, as well as a picture of the characteristics of workers willing to
work longer. It also provides an empirical basis for policy measures directed at
encouraging workers to postpone their retirement without forcing them to work
full-time.
The literature on the desired labour supply is sporadic, given the shortage
of individual survey data eliciting this information. Some notable exceptions
are Callan et al. (2009); van Soest et al. (2002) and Euwals and van Soest
(1999), who use data on preferred labour supply - respectively in Ireland and
the Netherlands - to estimate labour supply and the impact of tax reforms
and wage elasticities. van Soest and Vonkova (2014) exploit stated preferences
about different hypothetical retirement trajectories, with different ages of (par-
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tial or full) retirement and different replacement rates, collected by the Dutch
CentERpanel. They use this information to estimate parameters of the utility
function in order to simulate the sensitivity of retirement decisions to financial
incentives, showing substantial differences between results based on observed or
desired labour supply.
Our paper adds to the literature and to the policy debate by documenting
the gap between the preferred amount of working hours and the observed one,
at both the extensive and the intensive margin. To this end, we exploit an ad
hoc section of the 2004 wave of the Italian Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW), meant to figure out the “desired” labour supply of both older
workers and retirees. Our data testify to a displacement effect on older workers’
observed labour supply.
A non-negligible fraction of retirees would like to work, most of them with a
part-time schedule, and older workers declare that they are willing to continue
to work, albeit with a lower intensity. The gap between the observed and desired
labour supply is likely to depend on factors affecting the disutility of labour and
the utility of additional resources. Our results confirm that gender, education
and family composition are relevant factors associated with the desired labour
supply. The comparison between the observed and the desired labour supply,
in its turn, gives a measure of the severity of the displacement effect affecting
older workers with respect to their optimal level of work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of part-
time jobs as well as of rules for a more gradual retirement in Europe. Section
4
3 sketches the theoretical framework and Section 4 describes the institutional
framework. Section 5 illustrates the data and the variables of interest. Section 6
comments on the empirical findings separately for retirees (6.1) and for workers
(6.2). Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy implications of our results.
2 Part-time work of older individuals and grad-
ual retirement in Europe: an overview
How much flexibility is there in Europe for working schedules at older ages?
And where does Italy stand within this context? With 14 per cent of older
workers (formally) engaged in part-time activities, Italy has the third-lowest
number of older (55-65) part-timers in the EU, after Greece and Spain. The
number of part-timers differs widely across countries, ranging from 7 per cent
in Greece to 49 per cent in the Netherlands (Table 1). This gap suggests that
differences in preferences can hardly be the only explanatory variable, leading
to the conclusion that both supply and demand side disincentives, as well as
binding constraints coming from the legal framework, must play a significant
role. Providing evidence of the latent supply of older workers (i.e. desired
number of working hours) allows us to rule out the unavailability of older workers
to perform part-time work as the main cause of the Italian discrepancy. A
remarkable feature of European data is that where the overall incidence of part-
time jobs is higher, the percentage of older workers engaged in such jobs is
also higher. Conversely, where the incidence of part-time jobs is lower, this
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work is concentrated among the younger age groups. A tentative interpretation,
which is beyond the scope of the present analysis, is that the latter situation
provides an indication of precariousness, while the former suggests a better-
performing labour market and more efficient retirement rules (Devicienti et al.,
2016). More specifically, in countries where the market is more flexible and
workers’ preferences can be accommodated, the supply of part-time activities
by older workers is higher than/equal to that of younger workers, suggesting that
generally older workers prefer to keep working but not in a full-time capacity.
Part-time work at older ages can also be restricted by legal restrictions to
combining labour income and pension benefits. In extreme cases (which is the
case in Italy as well as in other European countries), after retirement age of-
ficial work means a hundred per cent taxation of pension benefits. Measures
directed at encouraging a more gradual retirement have often been advocated
as one of the features that could improve social welfare by allowing workers to
work (retire) more in accordance with their own preferences. Gradual retire-
ment comes in various forms, generally consisting of the possibility of combining
the accrued pension benefit (or a fraction of it) with work, either full- or part-
time, and either with the same firm (phased withdrawal) or through a “bridge
job” with a new employer (partial retirement) (Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008;
Brunello and Langella, 2013). Various types of gradual retirement have been
introduced and tested in different European countries, although the evidence
regarding their success, in the sense of a consequent significant reduction of
early withdrawals from labour matched by an increase in older workers’ em-
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ployment rate, is quite modest (Delsen, 1996). Highlighting the reasons behind
this lack of popularity is beyond the scope of this paper. They may come from
inadequate demand for part-time labour - indeed, a major issue in several Eu-
ropean countries (Kantarci and Van Soest, 2008; Brunello and Langella, 2013);1
from inadequate labour supply from older workers and/or from institutional
constraints (pension and labour market regulation). Our purpose here is to
look at the discrepancy between the effective and the desired labour supply by
older workers, as a prerequisite for the effectiveness of such policies.
3 Conceptual Background
Individuals are assumed to face the following inter-temporal maximization prob-
lem where utility depends upon consumption (c) and leisure (l) at each time
from t till the end of life T .
maxct,lt
T∑
s=t
u(cs, ls) (1)
The value function Vt is then the inter-temporal utility at time t when op-
timal choices are taken, as such:
Vt = u(c
∗
t , l
∗
t ) + βu(c
∗
t+1, l
∗
t+1) + . . .+ β
(T−t)u(c∗T , l
∗
T ) (2)
with β indicating the subjective time discounting factor. Leisure can have values
1Female labour supply, in particular, whose dynamics are strongly affected by the fertility
decisions and caring responsibilities (Battistin et al., 2015; Bratti et al., 2016), might be more
responsive to a smoother decline of working hours to retirement.
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between 0, when working full time, and L, when not working: 0 < l < L. In the
real world, leisure is not that flexible in its planning, as it is more likely that
agents have to choose between full time and or no work at all, being the part
time option rarely available. Let us focus our attention around the retirement
period. After reaching the minimum requisites for retirement (age or age plus
seniority) the worker can choose to withdraw and retire, or to engage in another
year of (full time) work. The trade-off implies that one additional year at work
translates into higher resources at present and higher future pension benefits,
but lower immediate leisure.2 Workers will thus compare the two utilities under
the two regimes. If the worker continues in (full-time) work after having become
eligible for pension, the intertemporal (time separable) utility she faces is the
following:
V w = u(cwR, 0) + βu(c
w
R+1, L); . . .+ β
(T−R)u(cwT , L). (3)
If she decide to retire, the intertemporal utility is:
V r = u(crR, L) + βu(c
r
R+1, L) + . . .+ β
(T−R)u(crT , L) (4)
where V w is the utility when working an extra year and V r is utility when
retiring.3 L is entire leisure after retirement occurs, while leisure is set to zero
2For simplicity, we abstract from modelling directly pension formulas which are not ac-
tuarially fair, when increases in the pension benefit do not compensate the forgone year of
retirement and the additional year of contributions (Castellino and Fornero, 2001). Implicit
taxation of postponement of retirement can be thought as unobservables affecting the utility
of working.
3We assume here that everyone retire in the next period (R + 1). This simplifying as-
sumption does not alter the main message of this stylized theoretical framework. Moreover,
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during working life, since workers are constrained to full time. Superscripts
in consumption (cwt and c
r
t ) denote states when the individual is, respectively,
working or retired. Consumption cwt is higher then c
R
t , reflecting higher lifetime
resources under the working regime, compared to the retirement one. The option
chosen will be the one providing the maximum utility, thus choosing to postpone
retirement if the following holds:
V r > V w (5)
If gradual retirement were offered, workers may choose a third option at time
R, with lwpt < L denoting partial leisure due to part time work. In this case,
they get an indirect utility equal to
V wpt = u(cwptR , l
wpt
R ) + βu(c
wpt
R+1, L) + . . . β
(T−R)(cwptT , L). (6)
People would not choose to retire earlier, were gradual retirement offered to
them, if4
V wpt > V r > V w. (7)
Knowing the ideal number of hours worked, we are able to detect if, and to
what extent, there is room for welfare improving policies, offering a more flexible
working schedule. Our sample of interest is thus composed by people who are
going to retire or have just retired but they would have preferred to stay at
retirement is assumed to be an irreversible choice.
4If instead V wpt > V w > V r, workers may decide to switch from a full-time to a part-time
working schedule.
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work, under flexible working hours. Knowing the desired working hours and the
actual ones makes our analysis feasible.
4 Institutional framework
The choice between protracting work and retiring depends on many economic
and institutional variables, having to do with regulations in both the labour
market and the pension system. One of them is the pension formula, which
characterizes the economic pros and cons of the decision, taking into account the
constraints on the work. In the case of Defined Contribution (DC) with actuarial
adjustments, the continuation of work is not penalized and the worker can freely
decide according to her personal preferences, possibly mitigated by firm issues,
on the one hand, and family considerations, on the other (Coda Moscarola
et al., 2016). When the formula is, instead, of the Defined Benefit (DB) type,
it implies an implicit tax on the continuation of work, which can be enough
to induce workers to withdraw as soon as possible. Another important feature
comes from the possibility of cumulating work and pension. DB pensions are
typically associated with strict limitations on work. In the case of retirement as
a zero-one choice, the worker is either engaged full-time or a full-time retiree.
The DC formula makes the combination of work and pension much easier, and
in variable ways, by reducing or cancelling the penalization on the continuation
of work.
Since our data concern Italy in the year 2004, we briefly summarize the
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situation in what follows. Retirement could be accessed at a relatively young
age through the so-called “seniority” pensions, allowing workers to retire after
a minimum of 35 years of service, almost irrespective of age, on condition they
do no work (or work part-time for the self-employed). Pensions were awarded
under a relatively generous (with respect to paid contributions) DB formula, on
condition they renounced earning from work (at least officially). Restrictions
to earnings were imposed even in the case of the (very rare) DC pensions.
For retirement at the statutory age (the so-called “old age” pensions) or for
seniority of longer than 40 years, no restriction to work was considered. As
for the labour market, part-time work has never been popular in Italy, as it is
interpreted as a constraint and not as a free choice. The trade unions were (and
possibly still are) in general rather negative or unconvinced and thus inclined
to ask for tight regulations on recourse to part-time work by firms, implying
administrative/bureaucratic restrictions on firms.
5 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW), and relies on data for the 2004 wave. The SHIW
data set is a representative sample of the Italian resident population and covers
about 8,000 households in each wave. It collects detailed information on house-
hold composition, income, wealth and the labour market status of the household
members, including the number of weeks and average weekly working hours they
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worked in the previous year. In addition, the 2004 wave includes questions to
elicit the respondents’ “desired” labour supply. More precisely, all the employed
workers (employees, self-employed, members of the profession, family business,
etc.) who are interviewed in person are asked the following question:
“ At the same hourly earnings, how many hours would you like to
work on average per week?”
Respondents who are not employed (unemployed, first-job seekers, homemakers,
pensioners, etc.) report whether they would be willing to work, and, if they
answer “yes”, they are asked two additional questions:
“ Considering the conditions generally obtainable nowadays if [name]
worked, given age, education and experience, would [name] be will-
ing to accept: Full-time payroll employment for the whole year/Part-
time payroll employment for the whole year/Only occasional, sea-
sonal or informal payroll employment/Only free-lance work or self-
employment”
and
“ How many hours a week would [name] like to work in this hypo-
thetical job”
We use this information to construct an indicator for the “desired participa-
tion” in the labour force (extensive margin) and to measure how many hours
per week respondents would like to work (intensive margin). While it is clearly
stated that wages for the hypothetical job are either current or market wages,
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the assumption that all the other conditions (availability of child and elderly
care, etc.) remain the same is implicit. In addition, nothing is explicitly stated
about the possibility of gradual retirement, namely the possibility of combining
part-time work with cashing in on reduced pension benefits, nor about the value
of future pension entitlements under different working choices (more specifically,
whether the pension benefit will increase in accordance with an actuarially fair
mechanism, or be less, as implied by the adopted DB formula). The assumption
underlying our analysis is that respondents refer to the current pension legis-
lation, which - as we have just seen - imposes restrictions on the possibility of
cumulating labour income and retirement benefits. For the purpose of our anal-
ysis, we restrict our sample to individuals close to retirement age, namely those
aged 55-70. Given that we want to focus on retirement choices as opposed to
continuing to work, we select individuals who are either still working or retired;
we exclude from the sample those who are unemployed, homemakers and those
on a different different social insurance scheme (disability/survivor’s/social pen-
sion). It is worth noting that while this sample selection is not a major issue for
male workers, as their participation rate is close to a hundred per cent, more
caution is required in the case of women, given their lower participation rate
(around 40 per cent). After excluding from the sample observations cases where
the dependent variable has a missing value, we end up with 2670 observations,
made up of 962 women and 1708 men. Figure 1 shows the distribution of work-
ers and retirees, by gender and age. In our sample, 77 per cent of men and 87
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per cent of women are retired.5 The incidence of retirees is obviously increasing
with age. This path is, however, not linear, and we observe a sharp increase
in the number of retired individuals around the “typical” retirement ages for
private sector employees in 2004, which were 57 and 60 years respectively for
women and men.
The regressors we use in our empirical analysis are factors that are likely to
affect the disutility of work and the utility of additional resources, along with
tastes and different attitudes towards the labour market. We use as indepen-
dent variables age and educational dummies;6 indicators for working (or having
worked) as self-employed or in the private sector; total net wealth; variables for
family composition (an indicator for being married or cohabiting with a partner;
a dummy equal to one if the partner, if any, is working; the number of children
living in the same or in another family); and two geographical indicators. De-
scriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.
6 Observed and desired labor supply
In this section we document whether, and to what extent, the labour supply
differs from the desired one, at the extensive and intensive margin. For this
purpose, we first illustrate the desired participation and working hours of pen-
sioners (Section 5.1). In Section 5.2, we focus on the subsample of older workers
5The sample of retirees consists of 2142 observations, while there are 528 working respon-
dents.
6Medium-level education captures respondents with a high school diploma; highly-educated
respondents are those with a degree or more. The reference category is low-level education
(compulsory schooling).
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and we analyse the extent to which the intensity in their supply differs with
respect to the observed one.
6.1 Retirees
A non-negligible fraction of pensioners in our sample declares being willing
to work. This percentage is about 3 and 7 per cent for, respectively, female
and male retirees. In order to describe their characteristics, we estimate the
probability that retirees are willing to work. Probit estimate results are reported
in Table 3 for the whole sample (column 1). Since the determinants of labour
supply could be different across genders (Peri et al., 2015), we show the results
for subsamples of women and men in columns 2 and 3, respectively. Confirming
descriptive statistics, male retirees are, on average, 4 percentage points more
likely to be willing to work. Looking at the age distribution, we estimate a
significant reduction by 7 percentage points in the willingness to work after
the age of 65 for men, while we do not find any significant path for women.
The desired participation of retirees turns out to be correlated with education.
Men with a degree are 4.5 percentage points more likely to be willing to work,
possibly reflecting a less physically demanding activity, higher attachment to the
job and a substitution effect driven by higher wages (compared to less educated
men). For women, the data point to a U-shaped effect of education: the desired
participation is lowest for women with a high school degree and highest for those
with a college degree. The desired participation of more highly educated women
could reflect, along with the effect of high-paid and less physically intensive jobs,
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different family models and attitudes to work. Lower resources and pension
benefits (linked to past wages) could explain the higher desired participation of
less educated women compared to those with a college degree, by 1.6 percentage
points. We estimate a positive coefficient for self-employment, while working in
the public or private sector turns out to be insignificantly correlated with desired
participation. We do not detect a significant effect of household wealth, while
family composition plays a role. Married female retirees are less likely to be
willing to work than their single counterparts, possibly because they can rely on
family resources to support consumption during retirement. Looking at men, we
do not find a significant difference between single and married men, while they
turn out to be more prone to work if their partner is working. This finding is in
line with the literature on joint retirement decisions, which shows that partners
show a tendency to retire together (Banks et al., 2010), albeit the majority do
not spend more time together, but rather they synchronize leisure (Stancanelli
and Van Soest, 2012). Finally, we estimate that the number of children increases
desired participation of male workers. This result is consistent with the intention
to leave a bequest or to help grown children through inter vivos transfers (Stark
and Nicinska, 2015), which are both common in Italy where 80 per cent inherit
a house. A further step to illustrate the desired labour supply of retirees is the
analysis of the optimal intensity in their labour supply. Figure 2 illustrates the
distribution of the preferred number of working hours that retirees are willing
to offer.7 A large fraction of them would work less than the full-time schedule,
7The reduced number of retirees who would like to work and indicate the desired intensity
suggests some cautiousness is required in the interpretation of these results.
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with a mode of almost 30 per cent of pensioners reporting 20-24 hours per week
(which is more than half the normal standard of 36). More than 25 per cent are
willing to work less than 20 hours, while more than 70 per cent would supply
up to 30 hours per week.
To illustrate which factors are associated with a greater desired intensity in
the retirees’ labour supply we perform two complementary exercises. First, we
exploit information on the desired type of job and we estimate a multinomial
logit model (Table 4). Second, we use a tobit model to estimate the number
of working hours desired by retirees (Table 5). Table 4 reports estimate results
for a multinomial logit model, estimated on the sample of retirees who are
willing to work. Potential outcomes for the desired job are: working full-time;
working part-time; working occasionally; and self-employment/freelance only.
Older retirees (aged 66-70) are less prone to work full-time, and prefer part-time
or occasional jobs. Education level is correlated with the probability of being
willing to work part-time or being self-employed, as opposed to part-time jobs.
Those with a high and low level of education are, respectively, the most and
least likely to choose self-employment. This is possibly correlated with different
types of jobs within the broad category of self-employment, being more likely
to be related to consultancy or professional advice for people with a degree,
and more physical jobs for respondents with a low level of schooling. Finally,
people who were self-employed declared that they preferred to remain in this
type of employment. Table 5, based on tobit estimate results, shows the effect
of covariates on desired intensity, given that the desired number of working
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hours is positive. As expected, retirees older than 65 would work 5 hours less
than younger respondents, with this relationship being significant only for men.
Highly educated women would like to work more, possibly because of different
types of jobs and their attachment to the labour force. Family composition
affects the intensity of the labour supply, mirroring its impact on the extensive
margin. Married women would work, on average, 3 hours per week less than
single women, while having children increases the labour supply of male retirees.
Finally, household wealth has a detrimental effect on the desired intensity in the
female labour supply, which is in line with recent literature showing a positive
impact of wealth on the labour supply (Picchio et al., 2017; Cesarini et al., 2015;
Brown et al., 2010).
6.2 Workers
We now turn to the description of the desired labour supply of respondents who
are still in the labour force. The distribution of observed and desired working
hours is shown in Figure 3. On average, older workers work 40 hours per week,
while they would like to offer less than 37 hours. The weekly working hours are
40 or more hours for almost 60 per cent of these workers, while less than 50 per
cent would like such an intensity; the gap between observed and desired hours is
even larger if we consider a working schedule of at least 45 hours per week, the
percentages being, respectively, 27 and 15 per cent. About 40 per cent would
work only a few hours less than the full-time schedule (30-39 hours), and 6.5
per cent would work part-time (20-24 hours). The difference between observed
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and desired working hours, for the whole sample and by gender, is shown, re-
spectively, in Figures 4 and 5. Positive values in those graphs reflect situations
where the respondent works more hours than he/she would like. About half of
the workers are not displaced; almost 40 per cent work more than the optimal
level, and for half of them the gap between observed and desired intensity in
the labour supply is larger than 10 hours per week. Finally, we estimate the ex-
tent to which desired working hours vary according to household and individual
characteristics. Table 6 reports OLS estimates, where the dependent variable is
the desired intensity of workers’ labour supply.8 We notice a significant correla-
tion between observed and desired working hours, which is, however, lower than
0.5, reflecting a limited correlation between the two variables. The number of
desired working hours turns out to be greater for less educated workers, private
sector employees, married respondents and those living in northern regions.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the observed and desired labour supply of people close (on
both sides) to retirement age, and identifies the individuals who suffer larger
displacement effects of their effective labour supply with respect to its optimal
level. Our analysis shows that a significant fraction of retirees would be willing
to work (3 per cent and 7 per cent for women and men, respectively). Male
retirees are, on average, more willing to work than women. A college degree is
associated with a higher desired labour supply, both at the extensive and at the
8Sample size issues do not allow this equation to be estimated by gender.
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intensive margin. Finally, family composition affects the desired retirees’ labour
supply, but differently for men and women and according to marital status. Mar-
ried women want to work less than singles, while men’s desired participation in
the labour market turns out to be higher when their wife is still working, in line
with complementarity in the retirement decisions of couples. Finally, retired
men with children are more willing to work than men without offspring. Turn-
ing to older workers, their desired labour supply is, on average, lower than the
actual one, indicating a preference for reduced labour activity. The evidence
on the discrepancy between the observed and desired labour supply suggests
that labour and retirement policies do not accommodate the preferred working
pattern of older individuals. However, while promoting flexibility in working
trajectories at the end of the working life can improve the welfare of workers
whose labour supply is displaced, the overall effect on the total working hours is
less straightforward. Some workers who chose part-time work would otherwise
have retired completely, but others would have kept working full-time, the total
effect on the labour supply depending on which of the two effects dominates.
However, as pointed out by Kantarci and Van Soest (2008), “previous studies
that make the quantitative trade-off of the negative and positive labour sup-
ply effects unambiguously conclude that the positive effects dominate: creating
more opportunities for gradual retirement can lead to an increase in total labour
supply”. Along with an impact on the labour force participation of the older
population, promoting flexibility in exiting from the labour market has other
effects. First, it can increase the job satisfaction and utility of workers at the
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end of their career, by allowing them to work at an intensity that is closer to the
optimal. Second, gradual retirement may prevent the use of alternative routes
to exit from the labour market, such as disability pensions or unemployment
(especially the so-called Cassa Integrazione Guadagni), which is particularly
relevant in the Italian context. Finally, it is worth noting that flexibility in the
working schedule may come at some cost for employers, particularly where older
workers are concerned. This issue goes beyond the scope of our analysis, but is
extensively discussed in Kantarci and Van Soest (2008).
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Distribution of working and retired respondents, by age
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Notes: 2670 observations (962 women and 1708 men).
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Figure 2: Distribution of desired intensity for retirees who would like to work
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Figure 3: Distribution of observed and desired hours for workers
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Fr
ac
tio
n
Le
ss
 5 5-
9
10
-1
4
15
-1
9
20
-2
4
25
-2
9
30
-3
4
35
-3
9
40
-4
4
45
+
 
Desired hours for workers
0
.1
.2
.3
Fr
ac
tio
n
Le
ss
 5 5-
9
10
-1
4
15
-1
9
20
-2
4
25
-2
9
30
-3
4
35
-3
9
40
-4
4
45
+
 
Observed hours for workers
Notes: 527 observations.
26
Figure 4: Distribution of difference between observed and desired hours for
workers
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Figure 5: Distribution of difference between observed and desired hours for
workers
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Notes: 527 observations: 128 women and 399 men.
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Table 1: Incidence of part timers across European countries (% points)
IT FL SW NO DK GE NL UK FR ES PO GR EU 18
Age 55-64
Men 6.7 13.4 12.6 13.2 11.4 10.9 25.4 16.1 11.3 4.4 12.2 4.5 10.5
Women 24 18 35.9 41.6 34.8 51.9 81.1 48.9 34.7 20.2 17.7 11.6 38.7
Total 13.8 15.8 23.9 26.7 22.4 30.2 49.2 31.2 23.1 11.4 14.8 7.3 23.4
Age 15-64
Men 8.2 10.0 13 14.9 16.8 9.4 26.2 11.3 7.4 7.6 6.8 6.9 9.4
Women 32.7 20.2 35.6 38.0 36.9 46.5 76.4 40.8 29.8 24.1 12.1 13.7 36.2
Total 18.5 14.9 23.9 26 26.4 26.7 49.7 25.2 18.2 15.1 9.5 9.8 21.7
Source: Eurostat 2016
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Age 61-65 .339 .474
Age 66-70 .33 .47
Medium educ. .243 .429
High educ. .273 .446
Self-employed .17 .375
Private sector .728 .445
Net wealth .147 .175
Married/Cohab. .817 .387
Nb. children (in/out) 1.83 1.238
Working partner .134 .341
South .252 .434
Center .249 .432
Notes: 2670 observations.
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Table 3: Desired participation (probit), retired
All Women Men
Male 0.532***
(0.102)
[0.042]
Age 61-65 -0.027 0.374 -0.125
(0.108) (0.285) (0.124)
[-0.002] [0.014] [-0.014]
Age 66-70 -0.654*** -0.476 -0.657***
(0.134) (0.359) (0.146)
[-0.051] [-0.015] [-0.070]
Medium educ. -0.088 -0.682** 0.059
(0.148) (0.290) (0.176)
[-0.007] [-0.016] [0.007]
High educ. 0.427*** 0.834*** 0.338*
(0.158) (0.296) (0.185)
[0.045] [0.049] [0.045]
Self-employed 0.286** 0.447 0.286*
(0.135) (0.288) (0.154)
[0.029] [0.022] [0.038]
Private sector -0.030 -0.193 -0.003
(0.117) (0.249) (0.135)
[-0.003] [-0.007] [-0.000]
Net wealth -0.042 -0.503 0.166
(0.276) (0.683) (0.273)
[-0.004] [-0.017] [0.019]
Married/Cohab. -0.559*** -0.908*** -0.273
(0.125) (0.196) (0.184)
[-0.065] [-0.053] [-0.037]
Nb. children (in/out) 0.109*** 0.071 0.111***
(0.034) (0.073) (0.040)
[0.009] [0.002] [0.013]
Working partner 0.275** -0.239 0.308**
(0.133) (0.436) (0.144)
[0.028] [-0.006] [0.042]
South -0.004 -0.743** 0.150
(0.118) (0.303) (0.136)
[-0.000] [-0.016] [0.018]
Center 0.183* -0.071 0.272**
(0.111) (0.229) (0.133)
[0.017] [-0.002] [0.035]
Constant -1.711*** -1.378*** -1.529***
(0.198) (0.366) (0.234)
Notes: Observations: 2142 (834 women and 1308 men). ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Table
shows estimated coefficients, standard errors in brackets and marginal effects in squared
brackets; other variables are at their mean value.
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Table 4: Type of job, retirees willing to work. Multinomial logit
Full-time Part-time Occasional Self-empl.
Male 0.011 -0.217 0.172 0.033
(0.063) (0.127)* (0.138) (0.106)
Age 61-65 0.026 -0.068 0.117 -0.075
(0.058) (0.099) (0.103) (0.083)
Age 66-70 -0.687 0.298 0.404 -0.015
(0.253)*** (0.156)* (0.162)** (0.159)
Medium educ. 0.031 0.361 -0.148 -0.245
(0.047) (0.107)*** (0.122) (0.100)**
High educ. 0.010 -0.334 -0.001 0.324
(0.042) (0.130)** (0.136) (0.124)***
Self-employed 0.008 -0.143 -0.296 0.432
(0.057) (0.137) (0.141)** (0.102)***
Private sector 0.052 -0.060 -0.026 0.033
(0.071) (0.093) (0.101) (0.090)
Net wealth -0.182 -0.270 0.146 0.305
(0.304) (0.300) (0.284) (0.198)
Married/Cohab. -0.003 0.017 -0.182 0.168
(0.060) (0.158) (0.140) (0.139)
Nb. Children 0.001 -0.001 0.009 -0.009
(0.016) (0.046) (0.043) (0.051)
Working partner -0.016 -0.082 0.124 -0.025
(0.075) (0.120) (0.114) (0.093)
South 0.024 0.090 0.005 -0.119
(0.062) (0.116) (0.115) (0.112)
Center 0.019 -0.123 0.124 -0.020
(0.067) (0.102) (0.096) (0.085)
Notes: Observations: 120. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Desired working hours (Tobit), retired
Women Men
Male 3.147
(0.843)***
Age 61-65 -0.602 1.508 -1.530
(0.890) (0.978) (1.043)
Age 66-70 -4.929 -1.610 -5.233
(1.269)*** (1.750) (1.412)***
Medium educ. 0.553 -1.770 1.497
(1.139) (1.143) (1.318)
High educ. 2.403 3.368 1.796
(1.243)* (1.406)** (1.426)
Self-employed 3.269 2.644 3.351
(1.111)*** (1.283)** (1.134)***
Private sector -0.314 -0.062 -0.519
(0.957) (1.173) (1.092)
Net wealth -0.800 -6.870 2.155
(2.446) (3.142)** (2.082)
Married/Cohab. -2.878 -3.177 -0.204
(0.959)*** (0.629)*** (1.626)
Nb. Children 0.752 0.373 0.728
(0.262)*** (0.326) (0.308)**
Working partner 0.976 0.240 0.877
(1.035) (1.578) (1.116)
South -0.110 -22.468 1.360
(0.961) (3.856)*** (1.066)
Center 0.527 -0.253 0.935
(0.944) (0.921) (1.096)
Notes: Observations: 2103 (827 women and 1276 men). ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Dummies for macro-areas are also included. Table shows marginal effects on E(dh|dh > 0),
where dh is the number of desired hours. Other variables are at their mean value.
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Table 6: Desired working hours, workers
All
Male 1.589**
(0.776)
Observed hours 0.434***
(0.044)
Wage -0.018
(0.047)
Age 61-65 -0.001
(0.645)
Age 66-70 -0.179
(1.465)
Medium educ. 1.266
(0.817)
High educ. -1.546*
(0.872)
Self-employed -0.317
(0.790)
Private sector 1.558**
(0.706)
Net wealth 1.291
(1.362)
Married/Cohab. 1.697**
(0.768)
Nb. children (in/out) 0.137
(0.231)
Working partner 0.126
(0.822)
South -1.739**
(0.765)
Center -1.492**
(0.697)
Notes: Observations: 527. ∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimated coefficients
are reported. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Dependent variable: desired working hours.
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